Traditional value of medical innovation models estimate the benefits of a new treatment to individuals who fall sick ex-post. However economic theory suggests medical innovation has additional benefits ex-ante -before susceptible individuals know whether or not they will fall sick. This paper presents a model for estimating the ex-ante value of new medical innovation, where risk averse individuals who are susceptible to contracting a disease in the future derive value from the existence of a treatment, because risk-averse individuals prefer to 'insure' against uncertainty in future survival outcomes. A healthy, risk-averse individual should value a new treatment for a disease and be willing to pay a small premium for it even if he never uses it because of his future risk of the disease. I demonstrate that when individuals are risk averse, the total ex-ante value is always greater than the total ex-post value. The difference between ex-ante and ex-post value is the 'insurance value' of medical innovation due to risk aversion. I show that 'insurance' value is highest for rare diseases, where afflicted patient populations are small but vulnerable patient populations are large. For very rare diseases, up to 64 percent of the value of a cure is ex-ante 'insurance value'. Using population-level estimates of disease risk for cancer, I find that between 24 and 63 percent of the value of cancer-specific cures are comprised of ex-ante 'insurance' value -estimates vary by the prevalence and mortality risk of each cancer type. These results suggest there will be under-provision of valuable innovation by the private biopharmaceutical market if only ex-post valuations are reimbursed by payers. I discuss these findings in light of renewed U.S. payer interest in 'value-based reimbursements' for pharmaceuticals.
Introduction
In this paper, I propose a new model for valuing medical innovation that accounts for the ex-ante 'insurance' value associated with the existence of lifesaving treatments. Traditional policy assessments of the value of a medical treatment are carried out ex-post, after it is known which individuals fall sick. These ex-post analyses typically use one of two methods: The first method estimates the value of a new treatment to a newly diagnosed individual by multiplying the estimated number of life years gained from a treatment by the value of one quality adjusted life year, and aggregates this value over all individuals who fall sick. The second measures the maximum amount of lifetime consumption an individual newly diagnosed with a disease would be willing to tradeoff for increased survival, and aggregates this value over all individuals who fall sick. Economic theory suggests that the correct way to determine the value of a new medical innovation is from the present, or ex-ante perspective. A new innovation confers ex-ante value to all susceptible individuals, since these individuals appreciate the existence of a treatment in case they contract the disease in the future.
Susceptible individuals are aware that they are at risk for a given disease, but do not know with certainty if they will contract the disease. As such, there is additional insurance value associated with the existence of lifesaving treatments, particularly when individuals are strongly risk-averse.
The difference between the ex-ante and ex-post value of a treatment will be the insurance value to susceptible individuals. Since the pool of susceptible individuals is usually large relative to the pool of individuals who do eventually fall sick, the ex-ante value of innovation will usually also be large relative to its ex-post value. I demonstrate that as a percentage of total value, 'insurance' value is proportionally larger for rarer diseases because rare diseases have large susceptible populations but small afflicted populations. Using a parameterized model and risk and survival data from the National Cancer Institute SEER Database, I show that between 24 and 63 percent of the value of cancer-specific cures is ex-ante 'insurance' value I begin with a simple example that illustrates several key points of the model and analysis.
First, when individuals are risk-averse, the ex-ante value of a treatment is always greater than its ex-post value and the difference between the ex-ante and ex-post value is the 'insurance value' of the treatment. Second, the insurance value of a treatment is higher for diseases that are highly deadly without treatment. Third, the ratio of total ex-ante value to total ex-post value is higher for diseases that occur with lower probability (rare diseases). Fourth, the percentage of 'insurance value' decreases with the probability of contracting a disease. In other words, in the presence of risk aversion, the degree of 'fear' individuals have for catching a disease relative to their actual risk is higher for diseases that result in severe health shocks and those that occur with low probability in the population.
I then present a generalized, multi-period, expected-utility model to estimate the ex-ante value of cures. The model estimates the maximum lifetime willingness to avoid the mortality risks associated with a given disease. Previous researchers have argued that willingness to pay for increases in survival are influenced by the (i) substitutability of consumption between time periods and (ii) the value of being alive relative to being dead (Rosen, 1988) . Following Becker et. al (2005) and several other papers in the value of life literature, I calibrate the utility function to reflect these two elements. Using the calibrated model, I estimate the value of treatments for rare diseases that occur with various hypothetical risk probabilities and estimate the value of cures for various cancer types based on U.S. based population-level disease risk and severity estimates obtained from the National Cancer Institute SEER Database. For both exercises, I find that in the presence of risk aversion, a significant portion of the value of a drug accrues to individuals who never contract the disease. Ex-ante insurance value is high for diseases that are relatively rare but where diagnosis implies severe mortality. For instance, 63.1 percent of the value of a cure for brain cancer, which is relatively rare (0.47 percent average lifetime risk) and highly deadly, will be ex-ante insurance value. In contrast, only 29.8 percent of the value of a cure for breast cancer, which is more common (10.7 percent average lifetime risk) and less deadly is ex-ante insurance value. There are several factors that affect the insurance value of a treatment. Firstly, the insurance value of a cure will be higher for diseases that are highly deadly, where survival without treatment is low.
For instance, holding all else equal, the insurance value will be higher for a disease where survival without treatment is 1 year compared to a disease where survival without treatment is 5 years.
Second, assuming a cure restores expected survival to that of a healthy individual, controlling for risk profiles, the value of a cure will be higher for younger individuals. For instance, a cure for a deadly disease will be more valuable to a 30 year old than a 70 year old, because a 30 year old has a greater number of years of expected life remaining and has more life to lose if he does contract the disease. Third, the absolute insurance value initially increases with disease probability before declining. However, the percentage of total value that is insurance value monotonically declines with disease probability, holding all else constant. Finally, the timing of risks also impacts insurance value -individuals will be more willing to pay more to insure against imminent risks compared to those that occur far into the future. The results in this paper are important from an economic and health policy perspective for several reasons. They show that since only sick individuals participate in pharmaceutical market transactions, but insurance value accrues to all susceptible individuals, there will tend to be under-provision of valuable innovation by the private market. The presence of ex-ante insurance value that cannot be captured by standard, marketbased transactions illustrates that medical innovation simultaneously has characteristics of both a public and a private good. Standard market based pricing in the absence of additional subsidies/ market protections will fail to adequately provide the optimal level of medical innovation. Since private entities make decisions based on private benefits and costs, the private equilibrium occurs when marginal private benefits equal marginal private costs. The socially optimal level of provision however, occurs when marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost. If there are benefits accruing to society that are not privately captured, there will be under-provision of public goods (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Roberts 1987; Weisbrod 1964) . Since there are ex-ante gains from new medical innovation, marginal cost pricing will fail to compensate for the additional social surplus that results from new medical innovation. As Danzon and Towse (2015) explain, firstbest efficiency can rarely be achieved in healthcare markets because producers cannot capture the full social surplus of innovation. My findings provide support for new value-based reimbursement schemes in the spirit of those proposed by Danzon and Towse (2015) that reward socially valuable innovations There is a shortage of innovation in certain therapeutic areas, particularly rare diseases. Pharmaceutical companies are highly sensitive to patient population sizes when innovating (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004). It has been posited that the lack of innovation in rare disease areas is due to decreased profitability because of smaller patient populations. According to the National Institutes of Health, there are approximately 6,800 rare diseases that have been identified in the US. A rare disease is defined as one that affects fewer than 200,000 people. As of October 2014, there were only 470 drug approvals to treat rare conditions, which indicates that there still remain more than 6,000 rare diseases without any available treatments. Rare disease drug development is challenging for several reasons. Firstly, the drug development process for any type of drug (for rare diseases or otherwise) is risky to pharmaceutical companies. Previous researchers have documented that only approximately 15% of drugs that are developed make it from the preclinical stages to market approval (DiMasi et. al, 2013) . Secondly, drug development is an extremely costly endeavor with the average cost of developing a drug estimated to be more than a billion dollars (Adams and Brantner, 2010) . Rare diseases have small patient populations, which likely mean smaller revenues to pharmaceutical companies. Thus, all else being equal, companies will be more reluctant to invest in the development of drugs for rare diseases because small revenue streams will not compensate for large development and clinical trial costs.
While many agree that there are ethical and altruistic reasons to incentivize research into rare diseases, it is generally believed that the overall welfare benefits of rare disease research are small from an economic perspective, given smaller patient populations. The results I present in this paper demonstrate that while the total value of cures will still be higher for more prevalent diseases, the percentage of insurance value, relative to total value is in most cases higher for rarer diseases. This finding justifies proportionally higher incentives for rare disease research.
While the results in this paper demonstrate that the true value of lifesaving treatments is higher than predicted by previous analyses, they do not provide justification for higher pharmaceutical pricing. Drug costs are paid for by patients who are afflicted by a given disease, and their insurance payers. The unaccounted ex-ante value of innovation however largely accrues to individuals who never get sick, and do not participate in the pharmaceutical market. This ex-ante value thus cannot be privately captured through higher pricing. Instead, the findings of this paper highlight the public-goods nature of medical innovation and provide justification for subsidies/incentives for valuable medical innovation. Since all susceptible individuals benefit from the existence value of a treatment, placing some of the burden of the 'price of innovation' on society as a whole through taxation, medical innovation funds etc. might be optimal. For instance, Conti, Glassman and Ratain (2015) argue for new pricing policies that reward the development of novel drugs that deliver significant clinical benefits. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews existing literature on the value of lifesaving treatments. Section III provides a simplified example that demonstrates the existence of significant value to individuals who never fall sick and demonstrates that the ratio of this value is higher for rare diseases. Section IV provides a model for calculating the aggregate value of life-saving medical innovation using infra-marginal utilities, Section V illustrates that there is large value associated with rare disease drug development that is unaccounted for in traditional cost-benefit analyses, Section VI estimates the values of cures for various cancers using risk and survival statistics from the National Cancer Institute SEER Database, Section VII discusses policy implications of results, Section VIII concludes.
Related Literature
Economists have shown that scientific progress and medical innovation has resulted in huge gains to social welfare over the past century. Murphy and Topel (2006) There is a small body of literature that explains that ex-ante decisions can results in different outcomes from ex-post ones. Philipson (1995) interprets disease as a random tax that causes individuals to engage in costly preventative activities (e.g. vaccination, less risky sexual behavior etc.) Similar to taxes that impose a burden larger than the revenues associated with the tax if costly tax avoidance occurs, a disease imposes a welfare burden larger than the incidence of the disease. Philipson and Zanjani (2014) argue that current estimates of the value of innovation are understated because they only take into consideration the impacts of new medical innovation on patients that are sick. However, they explain that healthy people also value medical innovation because there is a chance they might fall ill at a later date. For example, the health risks of HIV and breast cancer are much more 'smoothable' than before due to the advent of Highly Active AntiRetroviral Therapy for HIV and new and effective treatment regimens for breast cancer. They explain that while standard medical insurance enables 'consumption smoothing', it cannot help with 'health smoothing' if there are no treatments available. Thus, medical innovation is valuable to individuals who are healthy because it offers the ability to insure health. Traditional health insurance on the other hand can only fully insure consumption. Traditional health insurance's ability to insure health is highly dependent on the level of medical technology available for a given illness. Kremer and Snyder (2015) explain that if there is heterogeneity in disease risk, the nature of the demand curve for preventive treatments might affect the ability of firms to extract surplus for these products. They argue that preventives and treatments face different demand curves because the demand for preventives is generated ex-ante, when there is uncertainty in disease risk, whereas the demand for treatments is generated ex-post, when there is no uncertainty in risk because risk states have been realized. They demonstrate that if there is heterogeneity in disease risk, it is more difficult for firms to extract surplus from consumers for preventives versus treatments. is more difficult for these drugs to be profitable to pharmaceutical companies unless prices are high enough to compensate for anticipated limited sales volume. There are also several challenges faced during the clinical trial process that may render research and development more risky, including difficulty in recruiting enough patients into randomized clinical trials to meet predefined endpoints at generally accepted statistically significant levels Baicker, Mullainathan and Schwartzstein (2015) explain that behavioral biases can cause con-sumers to under-utilize highly effective treatments and over-utilize less effective treatments. For instance, diabetes medications that significantly reduce the risks of diabetes complications such as limb loss and blindness are often underutilized and associated with low adherence levels. On the other hand, antibiotics tend to be overused in situations where they are unlikely to be effective.
The authors advocate value-based insurance mechanisms that involve higher cost sharing for higher value care in order to correct for these distortions.
A Simple Example
In order to succinctly demonstrate the main point of this paper, I illustrate the disparity between the ex-ante and ex-post value of treatment using the following highly simplified yet instructive example.
I assume that the entire population starts off healthy and there is only one disease that can be contracted with probability q. I normalize the size of the population to one. Individuals derive utility from consumption and survival. All agents have homogenous preferences and attitudes toward risk and all agents are susceptible to the disease. Utility is strictly increasing and concave in consumption and strictly increasing and weakly concave in survival. 
Since utility is concave in consumption and survival, the more income an individual has, the greater his willingness to pay for survival improvements. Because of the concavity of utility with respect to survival, we see that the ex-post willingness to pay X depends not only on the number of life years gained, S H − S D but how far into the future these survival gains are realized. For instance, the willingness to pay for treatment for a disease where S D = 1 and S H = 2 will be greater than the willingness to pay when S D = 5 and S H = 6, even though both treatments results in a gain of life of one year. Now, we look at the ex-ante willingness to pay. If an individual suffers a health shock and there is no treatment available, his lifetime utility will be U (Y, S D ). This state occurs with probability q.
. Expected utility ex-ante is thus given by equation (3) below.
Traditional methods of calculating the value of a treatment would estimate the ex-post value of a cure to be the value of life gained as a result of the cure, X multiplied by the number of people who fall sick, q.
Aggregate value of treatment, ex-post = qX
In contrast, an individual's ex-ante value for a cure will be the maximal willingness to pay to avoid the risk of disease, and is given by equation (5) . An individual would be willing to trade some lifetime income/consumption in exchange for the ability to avoid a health shock in the future. W (q, S D , S H , Y ) is the ex-ante willingness to pay for a treatment and is a function of the probability of contracting the illness, q, survival without treatment, S D , survival with treatment, S H and lifetime income Y .
Since the survival term is constant across equation (5), we can rewrite equation (5) where Ũ (Y ) is the one-dimensional set of all points on the utility 'surface' U at which S = S H .Ũ (Y ) is increasing and strictly concave in Y .
We can solve for W to obtain
In the ex-ante decision problem, all individuals have willingness to pay W for the existence of a treatment. However, the expected value of life lost due to disease is given by qX. W − qX is thus the 'insurance' value of treatment. I show below that under risk aversion assumptions, the ex-ante willingness to pay is greater than the ex-post willingness to pay.
Remark 1: The ex-ante value, W is greater than the ex-post value, qX when individuals are risk-averse in consumption and 0 < q < 1
Proof: Since utility is concave in consumption/income, it follows from Jensen's inequality 1 that:
Second, we know that W is defined by the following equation:
Substituting back into equation (8), we see that
Since U is an increasing function of consumption, it immediately follows that W > qX.
Remark 2: The ex-ante value, W is increasing and concave in q for risk averse indi-
for an increasing, concave (risk-averse) function viduals.
Proof: The first and second derivatives of W with respect to q are shown below.
SinceŨ (·) is increasing and concave,Ũ −1 (·) is increasing and convex. Thus,Ũ (·) > 0,Ũ −1 (·) > 0 and
The inequality results follow directly.
Remark 3: The ex-ante value, W is higher when survival in the diseased state, S D is lower and survival in the healthy/cure state, S H is higher
Proof:
Remark 4: The fraction of ex-ante value to ex-post value, W qX is decreasing in disease probability q.
Proof (informal): Consider two diseases, one with probability q 1 and the other with probability q 2 where
, we require that the slope connecting the origin to point
) be greater than the slope connecting the origin to point (q 2 , W (q 2 , S D , S H , Y )) on a graph of W on q. We know that W is increasing and concave in q and that W = 0 when q = 0. Thus it immediately follows from the concavity of W that
Remark 5: The fraction of unaccounted value,
is decreasing with disease probability q.
Remark 6: The portion of insurance value that accrues to those who will never fall ill (hidden state), decreases with disease probability, q
Proof: The portion of insurance value, as a fraction of total value, that accrues to those who will never fall ill is given by (1 − q)
. Since 1 − q is decreasing in q and
is decreasing in q.
Modeling the Value of New Innovation
The example presented in the previous section was a simplified one-period model that assumed that all agents were homogenous. In this section, I present a multi-period expected utility model where agents have heterogeneous demographic types. Each period is assumed to be one year but the model is easily modified to account for other possibilities. The model estimates both the ex-ante and ex-post value of a cure. The ex-ante value minus the ex-post value is the un-captured insurance value due to risk aversion.
Individuals have a demographic type k and derive utility from consumption, C and survival S.
The demographic type k could refer to age, ethnicity, gender etc. 
Ex-Post Value
I estimate the ex-post value to a sick individual by estimating the maximum willingness to pay of an individual who has been newly diagnosed with a disease, to go from survival without treatment, S D to survival with a cure, S H . The ex-post willingness to pay for an individual of type k is shown in equation (16) below. X k is the amount of consumption/income an individual who knows he is sick would be willing to give up in exchange for increased survival from survival without treatment, S D to survival with a cure, S H . The t subscript denotes the time at which the individual is diagnosed.
Y k denotes lifetime income starting from the period the individual is diagnosed. If there are no treatments available, we assume that the individual pays nothing for treatment. The total ex-post value is then the value to all individuals in the population that contract the disease over time.
Total ex-post value,
N k,t represents the number of individuals of type k who fall ill in period t. X k,t is the willingness to pay of each individual of type k who falls ill in period t. Total ex-post value is then the sum of individual ex-post valuations aggregated over all types and time periods.
Ex-Ante Value
While the ex-post value measures the willingness to pay of an individual who knows he is sick, the ex-ante value measures the willingness to pay of an individual who is currently healthy, but knows he is susceptible to disease in future time periods. In the initial period, the individual is healthy with probability 1. In every subsequent period, he has a positive probability of contracting the disease. If he falls sick, his survival will depend on whether or not a treatment exists at the time he contracts the disease. The ex-ante value to an individual of type k, W k is the maximum amount of lifetime consumption (income) he would be willing to tradeoff for increased expected survival in subsequent periods.
The interpretation of W k is different from the interpretation of X k calculated in the previous section. While X k measures the ex-post willingness to pay for increased survival benefits when the patient is already sick, W k measures the willingness to pay, decided in the initial period, to be able to enjoy higher expected survival and health-smooth in the future if one happens to fall ill. In other words, it is the willingness to pay to insure against future health shocks and to restore one's survival to the survival of a healthy individual in the event one does fall sick.
If no treatment is available, expected utility is given by equation (18) . The total lifetime expected utility will be the initial period utility plus the utilities if one were to fall sick in each subsequent period weighted by the probability of falling sick in that period. If a cure never enters the market, the expected utility will be as shown in equation (18) where
lifetime utility, viewed from period 0, if the disease is contracted in period t and no treatments are available. p t is the probability of falling sick in period t. If the individual never contracts the disease, which occurs with probability p never , he enjoys the usually life expectancy of a healthy individual and a lifetime value function V never .
where the second equation follows from that fact that if he never contracts the disease, he will live until his expected life expectancy, T . The probability that he never gets the disease, p never is given by 1 -lifetime risk. If a cure is available, his survival is restored to the survival of an individual without the disease, S H in the event he does contract the disease. Expected utility is given by equation (20) .
W k is identified by setting EV no cure = EV cure . In other words, the individual, ex-ante value, W k equalizes expected utility without a cure and expected utility with a cure . The total ex-ante value for the entire population is determined by aggregating individual willingness to pay over all susceptible individuals in the population. N k denotes the number of individuals of type k in the initial period.
Total ex-ante value,
Finally, the insurance value of a cure is the difference between total ex-ante value and total ex-post value. 
where u(c k ) is annual (yearly) utility from consumption andS k is discounted survival.
I assume that lifetime income equals lifetime consumption plus healthcare spending. There are no savings, inheritances or bequests in the model. Thus, the lifetime value is given by V (C k , S k ) below.
where γ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and α is a normalization factor that determines the level of consumption at which point utility is zero. In other words, assuming an agent derives 0 utility after death, α determines the level of consumption at which an agent would be indifferent between being alive or dead. I assume that agents are homogenous in their degree of risk aversion. However, the model I present is easily generalizable to account for heterogenous attitudes toward risk. Finally, I assume that the value of a year of survival grows at the interest rate r = 0.03. I set β = 1 1+r and thus time discounting effects cancel out. While the specific ex-ante and ex-post values of cures will be sensitive to the specific parameters utilized, the ex-ante value will always be higher than ex-post value regardless of the parameters used as long as there is concavity in the utility function with respect to consumption. Sensitivity analysis for different parameterizations of γ are shown in the Appendix.
Value of Rare Disease Treatments
While society has long recognized that there is an ethical imperative to incentivize research into rare diseases, the economic justification for incentivizing rare disease research is less obvious. In this section, I demonstrate via a simple simulated model that while the total value of a treatment will still be highest for diseases that affect a large segment of the population, the 'insurance' value, as a fraction of total value is highest for diseases that occur with low probability.
To do so, I simulate the ex-ante, ex-post and insurance values for hypothetical diseases that occur with varying probabilities to a hypothetical cohort of 200 million identical individuals. I also examine how these values change for highly deadly diseases (survival without treatment of one year) and moderately deadly diseases (survival without treatment of 5 and 10 years). I find that the percentage of the total value that is insurance value is highest for rare diseases. I also find that insurance value is higher for diseases that are highly deadly. The reasoning for this behavior is that individuals live in more 'fear' of severe health shocks and hence would be willing to pay more to insure against severe health shocks. The reason I use hypothetical probabilities here rather than specific disease risk information is that because rare diseases affect such small populations, there is lack of reliable risk data by age for rare diseases.
This exercise is meant primarily to illustrate that there is higher proportion of unaccounted value for rarer diseases. I consider two scenarios. In the first, the risk of contracting the disease is immediate. In the second, the risk occurs in 10 years. These two scenarios are meant to illustrate that the timing of risks can also have an effect on the different between ex-ante and ex-post value.
When the risk is immediate, the amount of time available to make payouts is identical in the ex-ante and ex-post cases. In the case where a cure is available, it is expected to be S H . When the risk is anticipated to occur in 10 years however, the ex-ante decision problem includes ten additional years where individuals can make payouts to 'insure' against risk.
I assume survival with a cure is the expected life remaining for a healthy individual and is equal to 30 years. I consider three hypothetical diseases that are defined by their survival without treatment. For the first, survival without treatment is 1 year. For the second, survival without treatment is 5 years and for the third, survival without treatment is 10 years. Survival without treatment is 30 years for all three diseases because this is the remaining years of survival a healthy individual would enjoy.
Figure (1) shows the ex-ante, ex-post and insurance values when survival without treatment, S D is one year, survival with treatment, S H is 30 years and disease risk is immediate. We see that total ex-ante and ex-post value are increasing with disease probability, q. The (absolute) insurance value initially increases with disease probability before decreasing. The mathematical reasoning for this behavior is as follows -because of the concavity of the utility function with respect to consumption, the ex-ante willingness to pay is increasing and concave in disease probability. The ex-post willingness to pay however, is linearly increasing in disease probability. Consequently, the difference in ex-ante and ex-post valuations (insurance value) initially increases before decreasing. For rare diseases where survival without treatment is only one year, more than 60 percent of the value of an innovation is insurance value. The percentage of insurance value decreases as the number of years of survival without treatment increases. In other words, people are more afraid of diseases that result in severe mortality risks and are willing to pay more for the insurance value of the existence of a treatment. (2) respectively except that the risk of disease occurs in years rather than immediately. An interesting point to note is that the ex-ante value is greater than the ex-post value even when the probability of disease is 1. This pattern occurs because the ex-ante decision problem is viewed 10 years prior to the occurrence of the risk.
Thus, ex-ante, individuals have 10 additional years to make insurance payouts compared to the ex-post scenario. As such, ex-ante value is higher because an individual who knows with certainty that he will contract the disease in 10 years has 10 additional years to 'pay' for the existence of a treatment. Table 1 Since NCI SEER survival statistics are cancer site specific but not age specific, I adjust the median survival for the age of the patient using the CDC life tables, if the number of expected life years left for a patient of a given age group was less than the median years of suIrvival for a given cancer. Thus, I set the survival without a cure S D,k to be the minimum of expected survival years for a particular cancer and the expected life expectancy for a person of a given age. For instance, according to the CDC Life Tables, on average, a 70 year old has 9 years of life left (rounded to closest integer), conditional on having survived to age 70. Thus, if a 70 year old contracts a cancer with a median without treatment of 12 years, I set survival without treatment to 9. Since a cure for a disease is assumed to allow the patient to live aI normal lifespan for his particular age group, I set the years of survival when a cure is available, S H,k to the expected number of life years remaining for an individual of a given age using the CDC Life Tables, rounded to the closest integer. Table   2 shows the median age at which each cancer is diagnosed, the median number of years of survival and the percentage of afflicted individuals surviving 5, 10 and 20 years. For four of the cancer sites listed (Corpus and Uterus, Kaposi Sarcoma, Testis, Thyroid), median survival was more than 30 years. These cancer sites were dropped from this survival-based analysis because these cancers appear to have minimal impacts on patient survival if diagnosed early and managed appropriately.
Data and Methods
The NCI SEER risk of developing cancer dataset only provides 10 year, 20 year, 30 year and lifetime cumulative risks of contracting each cancer by age. I set the lifetime cumulative risk ('ever risk') to be the cumulative risk at the expected number of life years remaining for an individual in each age group and assume risk in the initial period is 0. In then linearly interpolated risks for all time periods with missing data. For instance, a 30 year old has a 0.03 % cumulative risk of 6 While I realize that this method is not perfect, given that chemotherapy was in existence at the time, the willingness to pay estimates calculated will if at all be under-estimates rather than over-estimates given that the true S D Scure will be smaller than our estimate. By using survival in the 1970s to calculate SD, I amI essentially measuring the value of survival gains relative to survival with treatments in the 1970s. Then, from this discrete CDF of risks of different cancers over time, I derive the discrete PDF of risks over time by age and cancer type. I also calculate the number of individuals in each age group that will eventually develop cancer, and the age at which they will develop the cancer.
For this empirical analysis, the individual's type k refers to the age of the individual. Individuals of different ages have different risks of developing each type of cancer. Furthermore, younger individuals have a larger number of expected life years remaining. As such, a cure will result in a larger number of life years gained for a younger individual than an older individual.
I calculate the expected lifetime utility viewed from the present by calculating the weighted sum of the lifetime utilities if the cancer is contracted in period t, V t weighted by the probability of developing the cancer in period t , p t plus the probability of never contracting the cancer, p never times the lifetime utility if one never gets brain cancer, V never . In then determine the willingness to pay in each period, w k (decided ex-ante), for the increase in expected survival conferred by the existence of a cure. The total ex-ante value of a cure to an individual of type k is given by Table ( 3) shows the number of individuals from the 2010 adult population that will eventually contract each type of cancer, the average lifetime risk, the average number of life years gained from a cure, and the individual ex-ante and ex-post willingness to pay. Individual ex-post willingness to pay is greater than individual ex-ante willingness to pay because an individual that knows with certainty that he has a disease will be willing to pay significantly more for the existence of a cure.
Results
The risks and life years gained showed in this table are averages. A younger individual will have more to gain from a treatment in terms of life years gained. The risk profile faced also depends on the age of the individual. There are some cancers that tend to affect younger individuals and others that tend to affect older individuals. will be highest for cancers that are highly deadly, that affect a small segment of the population.
However, in this multi-period analysis, the timing of risks also has an impact on the insurance value. As an example, a 50 year old will have less willingness to pay for a cure for a cancer that typically affects 30 year olds.
Discussion
In this paper I developed a model to estimate the ex-ante 'insurance' value of new medical inno- all else equal, treatments that confer higher life years gained will have higher ex-ante insurance value. Second, the more risk averse individuals are, the higher the insurance value will be. Third, holding disease risk profiles equal, willingness to pay for a cure will be higher for younger individuals because younger individuals have a higher number of years of expected life ahead of them. Thus, the value of a cure to the sick will generally be higher for diseases that typically afflict younger individuals in contrast to diseases that typically afflict older individuals (an exception is if there are a disproportionately large number of old individuals in a society, in which case, insurance value for treatments for diseases that afflict younger individuals will be diminished).
Analysis of the value of cancer treatments reveals several interesting patterns. First, holding survival and median age of incidence constant, the ratio of value accruing to healthy individuals who never develop cancer are larger for cancers which are more rare. Second, healthy individuals live in more fear of cancers that have high mortality rates. Willingness to pay by the healthy will be higher for cancers where survival without treatment is low (and survival with treatment is high).
For instance, a treatment for breast cancer which is relatively common (10.7% average lifetime risk)
but also associated with a lower number of life years lost (15.9) has a lower percentage of insurance value versus a treatment for brain cancer which is rare (0.47 % average lifetime risk) and has low median survival without treatment (1 year) and results in 35 life years lost on average. 30.1 % of the value of of a prostate cancer drug will be ex-ante insurance value versus 63 % for a brain cancer drug.
Furthermore, I find that in many cases, the percentage of value accruing to the healthy, and hence will not be transacted in the market, is much larger for rarer diseases. Since rare diseases often comprise large susceptible populations but small afflicted populations, the percentage of the value of a treatment that is ex-ante 'insurance' value is often highest for rare diseases. It is important to note that this is the insurance value in proportion to the total value of the drug and not the total monetary value to healthy individuals. This finding suggests that in order to reach the socially optimal level of innovation provision, rare disease research might need to be incentivized more than non-rare disease research. While altruistic and ethical arguments have previously been put forth for providing incentives toward rare disease research, our findings provide some evidence that there is an economic basis for incentive programs that aim to encourage innovation into rare disease treatments.
The findings in this paper illustrate that cures are highly valuable from societies perspective, both in terms of value to individuals who get sick, but also to those who never fall sick. However, innovation incentive structures currently in place such as the patent system have a tendency to distort innovation away from long term investments and cures (Budish, Roin & Williams, 2013) .
In light of this behavior, it is important to consider new value-based incentive and reimbursement systems that reward drugs that are highly innovative and of high value to society.
In this paper, I parameterize the utility function following the function proposed by Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) . As a sensitivity analysis, I calculate ex-ante and ex-post value for diseases that occur with various hypothetical probabilities using different values of γ (figures shown in Appendix). While the exact values for the ex-ante and ex-post value will depend on the specific parametric assumptions made, the ex-ante value is always greater than ex-post value as long as the lifetime or per-period utility function is concave in consumption/income.
The insurance values for cures obtained for cancer in section VI may sometimes appear somewhat different from those calculated for hypothetical rare diseases with similar probabilities. There are several reasons for this behavior. First, the rare disease calculations assumed a one time risk that occurred either immediately or in 10 years time whereas the cancer empirical analysis accounted for a richer risk profile over time. Second, since the number of life years gained from a cure will depend on the age of an individual, the age distribution of individuals in the 2010 population also has an impact on insurance values. Third, there are time effects at play. A risk that occurs more immediately is likely to be viewed differently from one that occurs far into the future. Thus, results in the two sections should not be directly compared.
One potential limitation of the model simulations and empirical analysis in this paper is that only mortality (but not morbidity) is accounted for. While individuals are likely to place more insurance value on a lifesaving treatment, there could also be significant value in treatments that improve the quality of life but not the quantity of life. One example would be treatments for depression that do not impact survival outcomes but do have significant impacts on quality of life.
The reason I focus purely on survival in this paper is that there is a lack of availability of reliable quality of life data. However, the model presented in this paper is easily modifiable to include quality of life parameters. For instance, using a utility function of the form
where Q is a quality of life weighting factor would easily account for morbidity effects. All other calculations performed would remain the same.
I calculate the value of cures for cancer to the static 2010 adult population from 20 -80. Since the ex-ante and ex-post values are age specific, population growth dynamics could impact the specific valuations of treatment. Finally, I consider the value of a treatment for each disease in isolation and assume that disease risks are independent. In reality, the risks of developing each type of cancer are likely to be correlated, but there is a lack of information on how risks for different cancers co-vary. The model presented however is easily modified to account for non-independent risks.
The findings in this paper suggest that the market will fail to provide the socially optimal level of medical innovation, since private payers will only reimburse the ex-post value. There are several ways to correct for this under-provision. One possible method would be for governments to add on a payment to private reimbursements, financed by taxation that is equivalent to the expected insurance value of the drug to society. Another option would be to provide subsidies and tax-credits to firms investing in the search for cures for serious diseases.
One such incentive program was the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983. The ODA, which awarded manufacturers of rare disease drugs with 50% tax credits on clinical trial costs and 7 years market exclusivity was intended to equalize the risks of rare disease drug development with those of non-rare disease drugs. An 'orphan' drug is defined as a drug for a disease with a US based prevalence smaller than 200,000, or a drug for a larger disease for which the drug will be suitable only for a subset of patients smaller than 200,000, 'an orphan subset'. The ODA was enacted in response to a perceived market failure for the provision of drugs for rare diseases.The ODA is the only healthcare based policy to provide supply side incentives to directly incentivize innovation (Yin, 2008) . While many agree that there are ethical and altruistic reasons to incentivize research into rare diseases, it is generally believed that the overall welfare benefits of rare disease research are small from an economic perspective given small patient populations. Our model suggests that the Orphan Drug Act can be optimal not just from an altruistic perspective but from an economic one too.
Several researchers have found that the Orphan Drug Act has successfully stimulated research into rare conditions. Haffner, Whitley and Moses (2002) and Wellman-Labadie and Zhou (2010) find that since the enactment of the ODA, the number of orphan drugs in the market has increased significantly. Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2009) find that the ODA increased the incentives for firms to develop drugs for small patient populations relative to larger patient populations. Thus, the ODA decreased sensitivity of drug availability and consequently patient welfare to market size.
The authors find sharper growth in drug consumption and larger declines in mortality for lowprevalence diseases relative to higher-prevalence diseases. Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2009) find that mortality from rare diseases has declined since the enactment of the Act. The benefits of this increased innovation are likely to be very large.
While external incentives are warranted when social benefits of a new innovation are larger than private benefits, it is important to keep in mind that subsidies and market protections could have unintended consequences. For instance, there is evidence that orphan drugs are often priced significantly higher than their non-orphan counterparts. Furthermore, since effort levels of firms are often not observable to regulators, firms might find it profitable to search for disease areas that will enable them to reap the benefits of innovation subsidies while exerting minimal effort. For instance, the ODA awards market exclusivity and tax credits not only for novel innovations (New Molecular Entities and New Therapeutic Biologics) but also for older innovations for a different disease indication that undergo clinical trials for an orphan disease. Since the same level of subsidies and protections are awarded both for novel innovation as well as 'repurposed' innovations, firms might have an incentive to search for older innovations that are applicable to the orphan market.
However, for some diseases, the benefits of these older innovations are likely to be lower than those of novel drugs. One solution to alleviate this problem would be to provide higher incentives for drugs that are New Molecular Entities and New Therapeutic Biologics.
Incentive schemes such as the ODA could have perverse effects on drug prices. Firms usually have a higher degree of monopoly power in an orphan market because in addition to patent protections they also enjoy ODA market exclusivity which may extend beyond patent expiry. The lack of competition from other firms will lower the elasticity of demand in the orphan segment. ODA exclusivity conditions could thus drive prices even higher than they would have been otherwise. here illustrate that the value of treatments is significantly higher than previously predicted, they do no provide justification for higher drug prices. Since only individuals that fall sick participate in the market for pharmaceuticals, only the ex-post value can be captured by market transactions.
New value-based pricing mechanisms and innovation funds might be needed to provide the optimal level of research into cures.
Conclusion
The value of medical innovation is significantly higher than previously estimated by traditional Statistics, the median survival without treatment for brain cancer is 1 year. One limitation of NCI SEER survival data is that it is not age specific.
I assume lifetime utility takes on the following form. Lifetime utility is per period utility from 7 ipolate does not draw a line of best fit but instead linearly fills in missing values in between non-missing values 8 While I realize that this method is not perfect, given that chemotherapy was in existence at the time, the willingness to pay estimates calculated will if at all, be under-estimates rather than over-estimates given that the true S D Scure will be smaller than our estimate. By using survival in the 1970s to calculate SD, I am essentially measuring the value of survival gains relative to survival with treatments in the 1970s.
consumption, u(y) multiplied by discounted years of survival, S. I set β = 0.97.
Without treatment, if a 30 year old gets cancer when he is 31 (one year from the present) and there is no treatment, he will live for one year. Thus, he lives for 2 years total (including the current year) and his discounted total lifetime utility viewed from the present is V 1 = u(y) 1 t=0 β t . If he does not get it in when he is 31, he could get it when he is 32, but then he would live for 3 years total, viewed from the present. Thus, total discounted lifetime utility is V 2 = u(y) 2 t=0 β t .
If he does not get it when he is 32, he could get it when he is 33, and so on. I assume that this problem continues in each period until he either contracts the cancer, or dies. If he never contracts the cancer, I assume he will live until the average life expectancy for a 30 year old. I weight the lifetime utility if he were to develop the cancer in time period t by the probability of developing the cancer in time period t. If he never contracts brain cancer, his expected survival is 50 years.
This occurs with probability (1 -'ever risk'). If a cure is available, I assume that this individual will enjoy survival of 50 years regardless of whether he contracts brain cancer or not.
Using this information, I calculate the expected lifetime utility by calculating the weighted sum of the lifetime utilities if the cancer is contracted in period t, V t weighted by the probability of developing the cancer in period t , p t plus the probability of never contracting the cancer, p never times the lifetime utility if one never gets brain cancer, V never .
With this information, I calculate the maximum lifetime income an individual would agree to give up ex-ante to avoid the mortality risk of brain cancer. To avoid credit constraint issues in the initial period, I assume that perfect credit markets and that the individual commits to paying w in each period he is alive to avoid the mortality risk of brain cancer. The total ex-ante willingness to pay is then W = w · S H where S H is the discounted expected survival of a healthy individual (since a cure restores survival to healthy survival levels).
From the CDC life tables, an individual who is alive at the age of 40 has 41 expected life years remaining (rounded to closest integer). A 40 year old who contracts brain cancer will live on average 1 year without treatment. A healthy 40 year old will live on average 41 years more (conditional life expectancy of 81) without treatment. Then, the ex-post willingness to pay is calculated as follows:
w I is the ex-post willingness to pay per period. The lifetime willingness to pay is then W I = w I ·S H Figures (5), (6), (7) and (8) 
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